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SYMPOSIUM
FOREWORD
Ellen A. Peters*
This Symposium on The Death of Contractwould have astonished
and delighted Grant Gilmore. Although he might not have agreed
with all of the points of view expressed by the various participants, he
would indubitably have been an enthusiastic supporter of the enterprise. His perspective on legal scholarship was unvarying: any idea is
worth pursuing, if the author is willing to commit to its serious pursuit.
Indeed his teaching style was that of an agent provocateur, of an interrogator asking often unanswerable questions in order to stimulate an
interesting inquiry.
Grant Gilmore's scholarly career was inextricably tied to the Yale
Law School. He left Yale, for a number of years, only because he felt
that the governing board (the senior faculty) was countenancing a departure from the school's mission of unconditional scholarly independence. The nature of the dispute has become obscure over time, but
there was nothing obscure about the depth of Gilmore's feelings.
When the issue first surfaced, several of us who were then still untenured (including, as I recall, Robert H. Bork) mounted what came
to be called the Children's Crusade, in an effort to persuade Gilmore
that his fears were groundless and that we valued his critical presence.
He postponed his departure (and, with his help, I was voted tenure
that spring), but ultimately he was not then able to be reassured by us
or by his other friends and admirers on the faculty.
Wherever he was geographically located, however, Grant Gilmore's intellectual outlook reflected the Yale Law School's pervasive
commitment to legal realism from the 1930s onward. Jerome Frank
was a visible and audible presence at Yale. All the faculty were expert
at demonstrating the fragility of legal doctrine and the ambiguity of
legal language. In the absence of fixed constellations in the legal firmament, attention necessarily focused on alternatives, on the critical
dissection of inherently imperfect solutions to particular policy disputes framed by factual contexts. Lacking confidence in jurisprudential outcomes, the faculty valued a wide angle of vision that took
* Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the State of Connecticut. Chief Justice Peters was a
member of the faculty of the Yale Law School from 1956 to 1978.
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account of traditional as well as nontraditional learning about the law.
In such a legal climate, any intriguing idea was worth exploring,
whether or not its hypothesis proved ultimately to be persuasive. The
Death of Contract was one such intriguing idea.
For me, reading the articles in this Symposium is an exercise in
nostalgia. It is a reminder of my deep and abiding affection for Grant
Gilmore, who, for thirty years, was my beloved teacher, mentor, colleague, and friend. It is also, alas, a reminder of how far removed I
have become from the heady intellectual climate of the Yale Law
School that so enriched my life for twenty-two years and of how little
time I have had to explore contemporary scholarship since I left Yale
to join the bench in the spring of 1978.
With these caveats on the record, I take it that my role in writing
this foreword is to try my hand at commenting, from my personal vantage point, on this Symposium's wide-ranging panoply of reflections
on The Death of Contract. I will briefly address each author's contribution in alphabetical order.
Professor Braucher is correct in her observation that although entitled The Death of Contract,the work was intended to convey Grant
Gilmore's underlying optimism about the ability of the law to adapt to
the changing needs of society.' Gilmore was skeptical about the role
of law and economics, because he thought that its teachings were far
removed from the vast array of factual distinctions that mark the circumstances of contracting parties. The Death of Contractreflects his
commitment to a jurisprudence in which lawyers and courts aspire to
respond affirmatively to newly emerging needs and controversies.
Thus defined, freedom of contract has not become outdated.
Professor Collins accurately identifies the underlying theme of
The Death of Contract as law's unremitting, but ultimately unsuccessful, search for a way to impose order on chaos. 2 Indeed, Gilmore
viewed with equanimity his own conclusion that certainty in the law is
an unattainable goal. In the speech that he gave at the University of
Connecticut School of Law, just one day before his unexpected death,
he opined: "If it were possible for judges and legislators to achieve
absolute clarity in their opinions and statutes, the process of adjusting
our rules to reflect changing circumstance would be even more difficult than it is now.... The great periods of the law may be those that
reflect times not of order and peace but of trouble and disorder."'3
Professor Farber is right to emphasize that Grant Gilmore's criticism of Holmes and Langdell was grounded in his profound skepti1 Jean Braucher, The Afterlife of Contract,90 Nw. U. L. REv. 49 (1995).
2 Ronald K.L. Collins, Gilmore's Grant (Or the Life & Afterlife of Grant Gilmore & His
Death), 90 Nw. U. L. Rav. 7 (1995).
3 Grant GiLnore, What is a Law School?, 15 CoNN. L. Rav. 1, 2, 4 (1982).
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cism about the viability of formalism.4 At times, that skepticism led
various observers to an overly romantic view of the flexibility of the
common law. That view was balanced, however, by a recognition of
the desirability of codification of the law, at least with respect to recurrent commercial transactions, so as to impose some order and predictability upon the proliferation of inconsistencies in common-law
outcomes. Even codification, of course, can be more or less formalistic in style; Gilmore elsewhere expressed his preference for the open
texture of the drafting of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
to the tighter drafting of Article 9.
Professor Hillman accurately characterizes Grant Gilmore's main
criticism as an attack on the rigidity of the formalist bargain theory of
contract.5 Much of the argument about the competing roles of bargain and promissory estoppel has centered on whether these two
views of contractual obligation had domains that were separate or
overlapping. Should promissory estoppel be confined to family cases
and gift transactions, or should it also play a role in commercial engagements, where presumably the parties have an opportunity to bargain? Gilmore noted as well that formalism about contract formation
had a carry-over into formalism about contract performance, with
seemingly opposite results: the former limited contract liability, while
the latter enhanced it. Professor Hillman rightly observes that the essential clue to resolve this apparent anomaly is to focus on juridical
risk, on the greater uncertainty associated with jury fact-finding than
with judicial application of rules of law.
Professor Hyland recognizes the important historical role that
legal realism played in the assault on formal legal doctrine that is at
the core of The Death of Contract.6 Legal history furnishes numerous
examples of the long-standing tension between doctrinal and factbound jurisprudence, sometimes manifested in the distinctions between law and equity and sometimes manifested in the distinctions
between bargain theory and promissory estoppel. Notably, despite recurrent critical assaults on doctrinal solutions, doctrine in one form or
another continues, hydra-headed, to re-emerge. Perhaps this history
counsels us to search for mid-level generalizations and doctrines that
are sufficiently open-textured in their articulation to encourage variation and flexibility in their implementation.
Professor Kastely locates The Death of Contract within various
historical and modem jurisprudential perspectives about contractual

4 Daniel Farber, The Ages of American Formalism, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 89 (1995).
5 Robert A. Hillnan, The Triumph of Gilmore's The Death of Contract, 90 Nw. U. L. REv.
32 (1995).
6 Richard Hyland, Life, Death, and Contract, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 204 (1995).
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ideology and contractual thinking. 7 She traces the capacity of contract
law to be used for ends that are socially desirable as well as for ends
that are socially objectionable. She concludes that only a purposefully
flexible view of contract obligation will enable contract law to serve
important values of human dignity, interpersonal connectiveness and,
ultimately, justice. The nineteenth-century view of contract law that
Gilmore deplored in The Death of Contract would not readily have
afforded recognition to the values of social justice that Professor Kastely rightly emphasizes.
Professor Linzer reminds us that The Death of Contract did not
purport to be the gospel on the entire law of contracts." Grant Gilmore started out as a commercial law scholar and approached the law
of contracts with considerable humility about its unfathomable complexity. He recognized that he knew even less about the law of torts.
In emphasizing that there was a role for reliance or unjust enrichment
in the imposition of contract liability, even when formal consent was
lacking, Gilmore did not intend to denigrate the central place of
promise and autonomy in the great bulk of contractual relationships.
Like Professor Hyland, Professor Patterson demonstrates that
The Death of Contract, while eminently successful in exposing the
flaws of Langdellian formalism, was not equally successful in dealing a
death-blow to other versions of formalism. 9 In The Ages of American
Law, Grant Gilmore saw, lamented, and recognized as inevitable the
recurrence of a search for theoretical solutions to real-life problems.
Perhaps what is at play is the deep-seated concern that, without some
guiding principles, the law would vest essentially unreviewable discretion in judge or jury.
Professor Rubin places his review, of The Death of Contract
within the larger arena of contractual behavior. 10 Grant Gilmore
would surely have agreed that judicial doctrine casts a lesser shadow
on alternative methods of dispute resolution than on judicial proceedings themselves. Professor Rubin's extensive discussion of the costs
and benefits of nonjudicial enforcement of contractual engagements
explains why ADR plays such an important role in the resolution of
contract disputes. I would add that, particularly in contract cases, the
array of possible nonjudicial solutions is often more capacious and
more attractive than is the choice among standardized remedies to
which the judgments of a court of law are necessarily confined.
7 Amy Kastely, Cogs or Cyborgs?:Blasphemy and Irony in Contract Theories, 90 Nw. U. L.
REv. 132 (1995).
8 Peter Linzer, Law's Unity-An Essay for the Master Contortionist,90 Nw. U. L. REv. 183

(1995).
9 Dennis Patterson, Langdell's Legacy, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 196 (1995).
10 Edward L. Rubin, The Nonjudicial Life of Contract"Beyond the Shadow of the Law, 90

Nw. U. L. Rnv. 107 (1995).

90:1 (1995)

Foreword

Although The Death of Contractspeaks more to principles of liability
than to principles of remedy, Gilmore's articulated preference for
flexibility clearly extended to all aspects of the law of contract.
Professor Testy reviews The Death of Contract from a
postmodern perspective." Rejecting the view of critical scholars who
dismiss contract law as inherently oppressive, she notes that contract
law has a dual mission as a vehicle for social control as well as an
opportunity for individual empowerment and freedom. That dual
mission is entirely consistent with Gilmore's own emphasis on a developing and ever-changing role for contract, a role that cannot be constrained within the classical doctrine of bargain theory.
Professor Yablon proffers psychological insights about a possible
relationship between Oliver Wendell Holmes and Grant Gilmore on
which I am not competent to comment. 12 I have never heard why
Gilmore undertook to do the Holmes biography. Although Gilmore's
earlier decision to write the admiralty treatise was, at least in part,
financially motivated (to supplement his teaching salary), it seems unlikely that financial considerations still played a significant role at the
time of the Holmes project. Perhaps Gilmore hoped to discover cohesiveness and found, once again, only disparate elements of an disunifled whole. To turn that adversity into an elegant lecture series is a
model to be emulated and admired.
My own view of The Death of Contractis more impressionistic. It
is fanciful to think that contract law is dead. The historical interplay
between contracts and torts has broadened, rather than diminished,
contract liability. Contract law, in turn, has broadened liability for
property transactions. The interplay of these various sources of the
law of private obligations illuminates the boundaries of each of them.
Boundaries do not, however, determine the core. We must continue
to focus on the strengths and weaknesses of the law of contracts per se
to assure its continued adaptability to the challenges of the world
around us. Beyond peradventure, that is the view of the law of contracts to which Grant Gilmore subscribed.
Grant Gilmore cannot have intended his title to be taken literally.
The Death of Contractmust, therefore, have had a different agenda. I
attach significance to Gilmore's admiring references to Cardozo opinions on the law of contracts. On other occasions, Gilmore was adept
at demonstrating the factual weaknesses, the inherent contradictions,
and the doubtful historical allusions that lie concealed just beneath
the glittering surface of many Cardozo opinions. The Death of Contract is a scholarly allegory on the role of formalism in the law of con11 Kellye Y. Testy, An Unlikely Resurrection, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 219 (1995).
12 Charles M. Yablon, Grant Gilmore, Holmes, and the Anxiety of Influence, 90 Nw. U. L.
REv. 236 (1995).
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tracts written in the style of a Cardozo opinion. It is always worth
reading and rereading, because it is stimulating, suggestive, elegant,
epigrammatic, enigmatic, and hence utterly fascinating. Also like so
many Cardozo opinions, on the merits, The Death of Contractis ultimately unpersuasive.

